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Abstract. The following paper deals with an issue that goes beyond the persistent di­
lemma of compatibility between Political Islam and democracy, taking the ratio one 
step further. Hence the author's intention, through methods of induction, deduction and 
comparison, is to present the theoretical standardization precisely on the relation of 
political Islam and consociational democracy, as an important model of eventual dem­
ocratic regulation in some Muslim societies. It is extremely important to emphasize 
that consociational democracy for political Islam should not be perceived as an ideal 
and most desirable democratic model, instead, it should be regarded as a solid basis 
for compromise for mutual political integration of different groups and communities, 
which due to a set of circumstances share the same state community. The connection 
between consociational democracy and political Islam will theoretically be sketched 
in several respects. First, as an opportunity for certain aspects of it to be incorporated 
into the political system of Muslim states, as guarantees for a non-Muslim or a popu­
lation with a different Islamic denomination, ie. in those systems which do not meet 
Lijphart's criteria as favorable conditions for consociational democracy. Second, as an 
empirical experience of the implementation of confessionalism with a focus on the 
praxisological benchmark of Islamic political entities. Third, the general axiological 
determinant of political Islam for the categories that are an integral part of the mosaic 
of consociational or consensual democracy.
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Аннотация. В статье рассматривается проблема, выходящая за рамки извечной 
дилеммы в отношении возможности сосуществования политического ислама и 
демократии, и является, таким образом, очередным шагом на пути ее разреше­
ния. Обозначенная проблема определяет цель исследования: посредством ин­
дуктивных, дедуктивных и сравнительных методов разработать теоретическую 
стандартизацию именно в отношении политического ислама и консоциальной
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демократии как важной модели потенциального демократического 
регулирования в некоторых мусульманских странах. Крайне важно 
подчеркнуть, что консоциативная демократия для политического ислама должна 
восприниматься не как идеальная и наиболее желанная демократическая модель, 
а как прочная основа для компромисса в деле политической взаимоинтеграции 
различных групп и сообществ, которые в силу ряда обстоятельств сосуществуют 
в одном государстве. Связь между консоциативной демократией и 
политическим исламом рассматривается в статье в нескольких теоретических 
аспектах. Во-первых, как возможность включения ее определенных аспектов в 
политическую систему мусульманских государств в качестве гарантии для 
немусульман или мусульман - приверженцев иных течений ислама, т.е. в те 
системы, в которых, исходя из критериев Лейпхарт, отсутствуют благоприятные 
условия для консоциативной демократии. Во-вторых, как эмпирический опыт 
внедрения конфессионализма с особым вниманием на праксизологический 
эталон исламских политических образований. В-третьих, как общий 
аксиологический детерминант политического ислама для категорий, 
являющихся неотъемлемой частью мозаики консоциативной или 
консенсуальной демократии.
Ключевые слова: политический ислам, идеология, модели демократии, консо- 
циа тив ная демократия, конфессионализм
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Introduction (Введение). Consocia- 
tional democracy as a democratic model 
emerged in an era when Muslim societies and 
states experienced a kind of political, eco­
nomic, cultural and social stagnation. But what 
is particularly characteristic of consociational 
democracy, that is, some of its elements, is the 
fact that they were already contained in the 
practice of some Islamic empires, especially 
after the Islamic military and territorial expan­
sion, facing the non-Muslim world. Certainly 
some of these practices have an Islamic legal 
dimension conceived from the very establish­
ment of Islam and its political organization, 
and some arose as a compromise and adapta­
tion to the current conditions, political power, 
ie weakness of Islamic society, and attempts 
for inclusive character of the modern state, and 
often a key factor in shaping them were the 
Great Powers, the colonialist legacy and mod­
ern neocolonialism. It is extremely important 
to emphasize that consociational democracy 
for political Islam should not be seen as an
ideal form, but as a solid basis for a compro­
mise for political integration of different 
groups and communities, which due to a set of 
circumstances share the same state commu­
nity.
Several key questions determine the re­
search framework in this paper. First, what is 
the significance of consociational democracy 
for the Islamic political perspective, in terms of 
the relationship between political Islam and 
democracy? Second, what is the general rela­
tionship of the Islamic political perspective 
with the model of consociational democracy? 
Third, are all the characteristic elements of 
consociational democracy applied in the theo­
retical-ideological orientation of the Islamic 
political narrative, as well as are the same ele­
ments represented by ideological-value (axio­
logical) and empirical (praxeological) dis­
course equally?
Methodology and methods 
(Методология и методы). The intention of 
the author in this paper is through the methods
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of induction, deduction and comparison, to 
present the theoretical and empirical standard­
ization of the connection between political Is­
lam and consociational democracy, as an im­
portant model of eventual democratic order in 
some Muslim societies. The significance of the 
relevant issues that will be covered in the paper 
lies in the actuality of the perception of conso- 
ciational democracy in the Islamic political 
narrative. Hence, we will perceive consocia- 
tional democracy for political Islam from sev­
eral aspects. First, as an opportunity for certain 
aspects of it to be incorporated into the politi­
cal system of Muslim countries, as guarantees 
for the non-Muslim or the population with dif­
ferent Islamic denomination, i.e. in those sys­
tems that do not meet Lijphard's criteria as fa­
vorable conditions for consociational democ­
racy. Second, as an empirical experience of the 
implementation of confessionalism with a fo­
cus on the praxeological determinant of Is­
lamic political entities. Third, the general axi­
ological determinant of political Islam for the 
categories that are an integral part in the mo­
saic of consociational or consensual democ­
racy.
In the discussion and discussion, the au­
thor takes into account the theoretical findings 
of the past period, especially of Horowitz and 
Lijphard, as a methodological framework. 
Thus, the application of the majority model of 
democracy, which is a defining feature of lib­
eral democracy in today's understanding of this 
concept, becomes problematic from the aspect 
of the issue of majoritarianism. Although in it­
self the majority component and category in 
decision-making does not necessarily lead to a 
majority, ie neglect of the interests of the mi­
nority, still when it comes to linguistic, cultural 
and religiously divided societies the situation 
is problematic. Problems in particular relate to 
control of resources and power, which can 
transcend or cause political permanent or peri­
odic instability. As Donald Horowitz points 
out in ethnically (we would add culturally and 
religiously) divided societies, majority rule of­
ten means ethnic majority (and / or religious 
according to our observations) rule, meaning 
very different from the rational meaning it has
in the form of fluid and a deliberate majority 
based on electoral determinations (Saveski, 
2011: 144).
That is why Arend Lijphardt dealt with 
the question of the stability and sustainability 
of segmented societies and how the decision­
making model and what decisions should be 
made analogously to such situations. One re­
search is quite indicative. It also supports the 
thesis of John Stuart Mill, who emphasizes that 
free institutions are impossible in countries 
composed of different entities, and the only 
public opinion necessary for the functioning of 
a representative government can not exist in 
societies with very weak friendly relations be­
tween members who speak and read different 
languages. (Mill, 1977: 547). Of course, this 
applies to identical, if not to a greater extent to 
the population with different religions or reli­
gious denominations. In his research, Robert 
Dahl concludes that democracies in divided so­
cieties are really rare. Thus, out of the 114 po­
litical systems surveyed, there were poly­
archies or almost polyarchies in 58% of the 
countries with low degree of subcultural plu­
ralism, 36% in those with moderate subcultural 
diversity and only in 15% of the countries with 
pronounced or extreme pluralistic subcultural 
mosaic. (Vasovic, 2003: 16). The example of 
Northern Ireland is highly illustrative, where 
after 50 years of unipolar, one-sided democ­
racy, a period of 30 years of violence and mur­
der followed, which ended only after an agree­
ment and consensus was reached for democ­
racy to function differently. In this domain, the 
substantive side, although elitistly based, is ev­
ident in the fact that it directly incorporates the 
vital ethnocultural and religious interests of the 
parties concerned. Given this fact, Lijphard 
concludes that what such societies need is a 
democratic regime that emphasizes consensus 
rather than opposition, which includes, not ex­
cludes, and seeks to maximize the size of the 
ruling majority, rather than dominating the 
simple majority, ie consensual democracy is 
needed. (Lijphart, 2003: 33).
From a methodological point of view, it 
is extremely important to note a certain termi­
nological dilemma regarding the naming of
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this model. Arend Lijphard, for example, uses 
the terms adjustment policy, consociational de­
mocracy, and more recently the notion of 
power-sharing. Gerhard Lehmbruch writes 
about proportional democracy, Klaus Arm- 
ingeon writes about negotiating democracy, 
and the Swiss use the term concordant or con­
sensual democracy to describe how their sys­
tem works. (Saveski, 2011: 147). All of these 
terms emphasize elements that are characteris­
tic of this model of democracy. In the existence 
of segmented and cross-segmented divisions, 
decision-making is adapted to the interests of 
different social and entity groups. Saveski con­
cludes that in order to reconcile all the details, 
which can never be considered unimportant to 
be abused as an occasion to inflame passions, 
negotiations are imposed as inevitable, hence 
the justification of the term negotiating democ­
racy. (Saveski, 2011: 147). On the other hand, 
the consensus refers to fundamental issues of 
common life, coexistence and cohesion of so­
cial and political life, which would mean that 
the term "consensual solutions" is also quite 
valid. But because our focus is predominantly 
oriented towards different social (religious, ie 
cultural) we will use the term consociational 
democracy.
Moreover, due to the current knowledge 
that is an integral part of the methods in this 
paper. Namely, Liphard points out that even di­
vided societies on potentially hostile pillars 
can achieve political stability, as long as group 
or party leaders are willing to compromise at 
the national level. Their agreements relate to 
nothing but the allocation of resources, with 
each group retaining the autonomy to use the 
resources it has acquired. This solution allows 
each community to continue to control itself on 
those issues that do not directly affect other pil­
lars. Such an outcome would point to a plural­
istic society governed by certain cultures, ra­
ther than a dominant culture and opposing sub­
cultures. (Hag, Harop, 2009: 120). Liphard 
also suggests that this model may also be ap­
propriate for less divided societies but hetero­
geneous states, and as such is a solid alterna­
tive to the British-style Westminster model,
that is, archetypal liberal democracy through 
modern discourse. (Lijphart, 2003: 33).
Research results and discussion 
(Научные результаты и дискуссия). The
central research result that will be discussed in 
this paper is the high level of compatibility, 
through the theoretical prism and historical ex­
perience of political Islam, ie the Islamic expe­
rience with consociational democracy and its 
determinant features. The author will see the 
characteristics of this model of democracy in­
dividually, in light of the Islamic ideological- 
theoretical positioning, as well as political ex­
perience, such as: autonomy of the segments, 
the possibility of a grand coalition with Islamic 
entities and the right of veto. The results of the 
relevant research suggest a high degree of con­
nection between these characteristics and Is­
lamic practice that as a theoretical framework 
would be used in modeling democracy in soci­
eties with significant Islamic representation 
and the relationship with minority ethnic and 
inter and intra-religious groups.
Consociational democracy as a system is 
inextricably linked to the attitude of Islam, and 
analogously to political Islam to other commu­
nities. Prominent Islamic activist from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, in his "Is­
lamic Declaration" best systematizes the rela­
tions that political Islam recognizes with other 
communities. First, with regard to minorities, 
non-Muslim minorities in the Islamic State en­
joy religious freedom and full protection on the 
condition of loyalty. Second, the overall rela­
tionship is based on several principles based on 
the Qur'anic verses, namely: a) Freedom of re­
ligion (Quran, 2: 256); b) Strength and deter­
mination for active defense (Quran, 8: 61-62); 
c) Prohibition of attack, aggression and crimes 
(Quran, 2: 190-192); d) Mutual cooperation 
and acquaintance of the peoples (Quran, 
49:13); e) Observance of contractual obliga­
tions (Quran, 9: 4); f) Mutual reciprocity 
(Quran, 9: 8). (Izetbegovic, 1990: 21). Because 
consociational or consensual democracy is a 
contractual relationship of democracy, in the 
sharing of power or delegation of power in cer­
tain segments, many of these principles have
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an appropriate application at the axiological 
level in its modeling.
Autonomy and separation of segments. 
The question of the autonomy and separation of 
the segments, ie the non-Muslim elements, ie 
the denominations of different Islamic denomi­
nation that we will treat here are inextricably 
linked to the historical component, the current 
socio-regional structure and the fixed provi­
sions of Islamic law that we have seen ideolog­
ically. Islam. If we consider some of the demo­
cratic elements of political Islam, the issue of 
the attitude towards non-Muslims (kafir) in the 
Islamic domain is also significant. Thus, ac­
cording to Shari'a regulations, they enjoy uni­
versal justice, protection from external aggres­
sion and internal injustice, protection of prop­
erty, honor, protection of religious buildings, 
social justice and protection, freedom of move­
ment and work, etc. (Alibasic, 2015: 34-39).
It is very important to note that the au­
tonomy of the segments can be territorial and 
functional. Both are notable in Muslim history, 
and the latter has a fixed nature, ie Islamic le­
gal regulation. From an axiological discourse, 
as noted by Ahmed Alibasic, Islamic law pro­
vides for special norms for non-Muslims in sit­
uations where equating them with Muslims 
would offend their religious customs. Hence, 
non-Muslims are exempt from paying zakat 
(religious Muslim tax), nor are they required to 
participate in military obligations (jihad), and 
in return are obliged to pay jizya (protection 
tax by the Islamic State). Non-Muslims cannot 
be subject to laws that do not identify them, es­
pecially in family and inheritance law. Islam 
means guaranteeing them legal, functional au­
tonomy. (Alibasic, 2015: 43). In the field of 
family law, inheritance law, non-Muslims in 
the classical Islamic period (such as the Ab- 
basid Caliphate or the Ottoman Empire) regu­
lated their own relations and drafted a number 
of regulations that were not limited to this sub­
ject. (El-Ajid, 2006: 51). On the other hand, as 
is already known in the field of criminal law, 
only those punishments that are compatible 
with their religion were applied, but not issues 
that are not legally sanctioned in Christianity, 
such as alcohol, pork, etc. (El-Ajid, 2006: 50).
To illustrate, the functional autonomy of 
the segments functioned in the Ottoman Em­
pire through the millet system, which was a so­
cial form of social division on a religious basis, 
ie it expressed a form of social-religious auton­
omy. Each millet exercised its rights through 
its own institutions such as religious courts, re­
ligious schools, etc. The millet referred to non- 
Muslims according to ethnographic key and to 
Muslims regardless of nationality. Thus the 
following millets were legalized: Muslim mil­
let - w ithout division into Turkish, Kurdish 
and Arabic, rum millet - Eastern Orthodox led 
by Constantinople, Frankish millet - for all 
Roman Catholics, Armenian-Gregorian millet, 
Armenian Roman-Catholic millet, and Bulgar­
ian Orthodox millet (Sahin, 2012: 183).
From modern discourse, reminiscently, 
we should note that the Constitution of Egypt 
proposed and conditional by the President sup­
ported by the Muslim Brotherhood Mohamed 
Morsi, contained similar provisions for Chris­
tians and Jews, ie the application of the reli­
gious law of personal, family status. as well as 
the election of their spiritual leaders (Egypt’s 
2012 Constitution: art. 3).
Territorial autonomy is more recent and 
here we need to point out a few features. Polit­
ical Islam gives priority to functional rather 
than territorial autonomy. However, the case of 
Iraq confirms that political Islam has the ca­
pacity in complex circumstances to agree to 
such solutions as in Iraq-Kurdistan under the 
2005 Constitution, supported including by the 
Islamic Dawa (Prayer) Party. Thus, the Consti­
tution defines the Kurdish region as a federal 
unit of the Iraqi state, with Arabic and Kurdish 
as official languages and an independent ad­
ministration known as the Kurdish regional 
government (Iraq’s 2005 Constitution: art. 
116-118).
Finally, regarding the separation of seg­
ments as a favorable condition for the develop­
ment of consociational democracy, it should be 
noted that by their physiognomy the Muslim 
community in multi-confessional societies as 
well as non-Muslim communities live in cer­
tain regions or neighborhoods with a predomi-
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nantly own population, such as , south of Leb­
anon, north of Iraq and southwest of Turkey 
with the Kurds, north of Syria with the Alevis, 
east of Iraq with the Shiites, etc. Describing the 
traditional Muslim societies, Tarik Kulenovic 
states that in the cities in the Islamic bazaars, 
different religious and social entities were 
found, and in the neighborhoods (city quarters) 
live originally members of one religion (Ku­
lenovic, 2008: 48).
Opportunity for a grand coalition with 
Islamic entities. The potential grand coalition 
in which Islamic political entities would par­
ticipate is also an issue that can be considered 
from axiological and praxeological discourse, 
noting that here praxeological discourse is sig­
nificantly richer and conditioned by the politi­
cal processes and factors in a particular Mus­
lim country. The grand coalition was the result 
of post-conflict peace-building in some Mus­
lim countries, seeking through a common con­
sensus of all major actors, including of course 
Islamic parties, to build a new constitution that 
would incorporate democratic principles as 
well as traditional Islamic values.
The grand coalition is logically a solu­
tion in systems where there is a constitutional 
and politically established multipartyism of 
different denominations and religions. Politi­
cal Islam in this domain does not remain im­
mune to such determined processes. Two 
methodological notes should be noted here. 
First, the aspect of the potential for grand coa­
litions with Islamic political entities should be 
treated through the prism of coalition potential 
with Christian or Jewish, as well as with secu­
lar-liberal, socialist or party articulators and 
representatives of different Islamic denomina­
tions. Second, we will perceive the potential of 
Islamic parties through a praxeological prism, 
while we will derive the axiological moment 
with the Qur'anic provision and practice of the 
Prophet Muhammad, as a source of value ori­
entation of political Islam.
The axiological dimension of the possi­
bility of a coalition of Islamic subjects with 
non-Islamic uninformed readers may lead him 
to a dubiousness. Namely, the fifth verse of Su­
rat al-Ma'ida (Sophra) says: “O believers, do
not take Christians and Jews as protectors. 
They are protectors of each other. And those 
who will take you as protectors from you - 
they really are! Surely Allah does not guide the 
people unjustly!” (Quran, 5: 51). However, Ibn 
Kesir's tafsir (Qur'anic interpretation) indicates 
that this verse was published as a warning to 
Muslims not to all Jews and Christians (as ev­
idenced by the other Qur'anic provisions for re­
spect, tolerance and harmony), but to those 
who are enemies of Islam and Muslims and 
who have conspiratorial tendencies towards 
the Prophet (Ibn Kesir, 2014). Analogous to 
such an argument, Louis Safi notes that the 
practice and fundamental principles of the Me­
dina State governed by the Prophet contain, in­
ter alia, the following principles: First, the Is­
lamic political system embracing the principle 
of religious tolerance based on religious free­
dom for all social actors. The Charter empha­
sizes the fundamental importance of co-opera­
tion between Muslims and non-Muslims in es­
tablishing justice and defending against mili­
tary aggression. Second, the charter stipulates 
that in the new system, social and political re­
lations must satisfy universal values such as 
the equality of all people and equal treatment. 
Sovereignty does not belong to individuals - 
rulers or a special group, but to the law (mean­
ing Islamic, i.e Jewish) based on justice, fair­
ness and dignity of individuals (Safi, 2001: 
66). These institutes and practices for the pro­
tagonists of a coalition government, especially 
from the Wasatiyyah (moderate) branch of po­
litical Islam (whether Sunni or Shiite), are ar­
gued as an adequate apology for such political 
steps.
The grand coalition in contemporary dis­
course is manifested in the Muslim world with 
political Islam, as its partner or bearer, through 
a triple perspective. First, as a systemic solu­
tion imposed after military intervention, ie in­
ter-religious conflicts, second, as a constitutive 
custom imposed after the creation of a certain 
state and third, after the coming to power of an 
Islamic entity for democratic transition as a re­
sult of the overthrow of a regime. The first and 
third cases are not according to Liphard's 
model for a coalition of all entities, but it serves
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us to demonstrate the coalition capacity of Is­
lamic parties, especially in countries where 
some elements of consociational democracy 
are looming.
The first case is typical of Iraq after the 
US military intervention in 2003 and the over­
throw of Saddam Hussein's regime. The two 
largest Islamic political entities of Shiite 
origin, the Islamic Dawa Party and the Islamic 
Supreme Council, have joined a coalition pri­
marily called the United Iraqi Alliance. It was 
formed by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and in­
cluded Abdulaziz al-Hakim, Ahmed Chalabi (a 
secularist and nationalist option), as well as 
other Shiite, Turkmen parties, as well as inde­
pendent Sunni and tribal leaders (Kern, 2006: 
634). The 2010 Coalition is renamed the Rule 
of Law Coalition with an almost identical 
structure. What should be noted is that this co­
alition participated in the adoption of the Con­
stitution of the country that provides autonomy 
to the Kurdish region. From 2018, on the eve 
of the parliamentary elections, the most strik­
ing example is the Islamist party of Moqtada 
al-Sadr, whose grand coalition “Reform Alli­
ance” managed to unite the communist, Sunni 
and secularist parties1 (BBC, 2018).
The second point concerns the Lebanese 
system. Hezbollah as part of the grand March 
8 coalition, which has Shiite, Sunni and nation­
alist entities. Despite divisions with Amal, it 
was not a problem for Hezbollah to accept the 
March 8 Alliance coalition and integrate 
Michel Aoun's Christian Maronite party (Nor­
ton, 2007: 485-486). Hezbollah also does not 
dispute the system of division of seats under 
the Taif agreement, nor the constitutive custom  
of proportional distribution of the head of the 
legislature, the state and the executive. Finally, 
for the latest form of coalition, the best illus­
trators are Tunisia and the Islamic Al- Nahda 
party. After the overthrow of Ben Ali's regime, 
Rashid Ghannouchi and his followers formed 
a coalition with the Social Democrats Nidaa
Tunisia, and nothing prevented the liberal sec­
ularists Afek Tunisia from participating in the 
governing coalition.
The right of veto. If the previous features 
of consociational democracy have a significant 
axiological and praxeological basis in political 
Islam, the issue of the veto is the least elabo­
rated in both Islamic political thought and the 
practice of Islamic subjects. The reasons for 
such a situation are multiple. First, from a his­
torical perspective, the veto issue emerges 
much later as a constellation of a process of 
peace agreements and solutions to conflict ar­
eas. Such a way of dismissal was not known 
during the time of the Prophet and for later 
generations of Islamic thinkers. Second, Is­
lamic political thought abounds in a series of 
categories of protection of non-Muslims in the 
Islamic State, and the legislature is limited to 
making decisions contrary to sharia, so analo­
gously it is limited to making laws that would 
have negative implications for religious or cul­
tural identity of the other citizens. Third, for Is­
lam, as we have already noted, linguistic and 
ethnic differences are irrelevant because their 
primary political and social motive for legiti­
macy is religious. In this regard, Islamic sub­
jects do not have a particular problem with 
multilingualism, through an axiological prism. 
The branches of the Muslim Brotherhood best 
illustrate this. However, such problems can 
arise when political Islam from the Wasatiyyah 
(moderate) branch also gains a strong national­
ist weight, so the elaborations from an Islamic 
perspective are irrelevant, and the nationalist 
dimensions are authoritative.
One allusion that can be qualified from  
the time of the Prophet Muhammad from an 
axiological point of view on the issue of veto 
is a case on the occasion of which 44 verses 
from Surat al-Ma'ida were published. Namely, 
in the Jewish fortress Khyber, a married Jew  
and a married Jewish woman were found in 
adultery. According to the regulations of the 
Torah, they were to be stoned, but since they 
were from a respectable family, the delegation
1 BBC News (2018), Shia Cleric Moqtada Sadr’s bloc 
wins Iraqi Elections, Available at:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
44178771.
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asked the Prophet to exempt the application of 
this law. Muhammad vetoed the arbitrary as­
sessment and ruled that the provisions of the 
Torah should be applied in accordance with the 
stoning (Quran, 5: 51). In this case, the 
Prophet, through the veto, played the role of 
protector of the religious identity of the Jews, 
judging by their law.
The right of veto has practically explicit 
categorization and application in countries 
with a Muslim population only in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Implicitly, the veto has little ap­
plication in Lebanon. In Bosnia and Herze­
govina, Alija Izetbegovic's Islamic Party, as a 
signatory to the Dayton Accords, agreed to a 
veto principle based on a statement of a law 
that is “detrimental to the vital interests” of one 
of the communities (Bosniak, Croat or Serb). ), 
so if the entity parliament with a 2/3 majority 
adopts such a statement, the law does not enter 
into force (Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine). In 
Lebanon, on the other hand, the situation is 
slightly different and less used. The speaker of 
the assembly, the speaker, who is part of the 
troika, has a veto (and belongs to the Shiite Is­
lamic political current - Hezbollah or Amal) 
on systemic laws in the country under the Ta’if 
agreement, and also the distribution of seats, 
which is now par. can be changed without a 
two-thirds majority in the Government of Na­
tional Unity, which implicitly suggests a veto 
by one of the communities, given the difficult 
achievement of such a qualified majority. 
(Lebanon’s Constitution, art. 24).
Conclusion (Заключение). Each of the 
models of democracy with some of its value 
postulates finds points of contact on an axio­
logical and / or praxeological level with politi­
cal Islam and its bearers and representatives in 
the party spectrum. In this regard, the essential 
features of consociational democracy such as 
autonomy of segments, coalition capacity, em­
phasis on religious peculiarities, and even the 
right of veto are relevant criteria for political 
Islam that justify the thesis of its durability and 
functionality in consociational democracy.
In the direction of the criteria and goals 
of our paper that we set in the introductory part, 
as well as the methodology and methods, we
can draw several relevant conclusions. First, 
the importance of consociational democracy 
for political Islam can be seen from a dual per­
spective. On the one hand, as a solid element 
for stabilization of the divided societies with a 
significant Islamic population, which at the 
moment are in a state of post-conflict peace 
building. On the other hand, the orientation to­
wards a democratic order from both an axio­
logical and a praxeological perspective is af­
firmed in value. In addition, such results speak 
inductively for the very compatibility of polit­
ical Islam and democracy.
Second, as we have already pointed out, 
the general relationship between political Is­
lam and consociational democracy implies two 
important dimensions. If the Shari'a postulates, 
which are the main ideological element of po­
litical Islam, are respected, the relations be­
tween the various non-Islamic groups must be 
based on the protection and freedom of reli­
gion. On the other hand, the overall relations in 
an Islamic society towards all groups are based 
on certain values such as freedom of religion, 
strength and determination for active defense, 
prohibition of attack, aggression and crimes, 
mutual cooperation and acquaintance of peo­
ples with each other, respect for contractual 
obligations and mutual reciprocity.
Finally, all value elements and favorable 
factors for consociational democracy have 
their representation at the axiological and 
praxeological level in the ideological and em­
pirical aspect of political Islam. Such represen­
tation is reflected in historical experience, sha­
ria norms, and the socio-demographic config­
uration of societies with significant Islamic 
populations. The autonomy and segregation of 
the segments has almost equal stagnation 
throughout all three noted aspects. The veto 
has little Shari'a support, except for one hadith 
from the Prophet Muhammad, but his experi­
ence in the Muslim world is significant as a po­
litical practice to which Islamic subjects also 
resort. The possibility of a grand coalition with 
Islamic subjects is also strongly supported by 
Sharia law in the Sunnah of the Prophet Mu­
hammad and the principles of the Medina state 
he ruled, and the modern practice in religiously
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divided societies such as Iraq and Lebanon is 
evident.
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